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1. Introduction 
The ability of the United States (U.S.) to influence policies in Colombia is indisputable. The U.S. 
is Colombia’s largest trading partner, and this alone provides the U.S. with great power with 
regards to Colombian policymaking. U.S. power is not only manifest within the economic realm, 
though, as Colombia is a consumer of many U.S. cultural products, but U.S. political decisions 
also greatly inform Colombian policymaking. 
However, the nature of decisions in the U.S., and their influence, only partially explains policies 
in Colombia. Domestic policies also remain shaped by the configuration of different actors, 
agendas, and interests within the country itself.    
In this chapter, we argue that although there are shifts in the agenda between both countries, we 
should not understand these changes as only due to the rhetoric and the style brought by the 
Trump government. The policy changes also relate to internal political processes within 
Colombia, alongside other external factors. 
 
Whereas one might argue that there are changes with regards to policies concerning counter-
narcotics, international affairs (particularly in relation to Venezuela), and military cooperation, 
these policies are, in fact, a continuation of long-standing policies that have only shifted in their 
approaches. Counter-narcotics, Venezuela, and military cooperation are indeed central to the 
bilateral agenda, but they have been central to this agenda for several years.   
 
In addition, although U.S. power can be seen as diminishing in Colombia, and other countries in 
the region, given the growing presence of China, the influence of the U.S. is still prevalent.
1
 In 
the case of Colombia, and given the nature of the policies and challenges that connect these two 
countries, U.S. power and influence remain significant. Whereas the U.S. can be understood as a 
hegemon in decay, it is still a hegemon, and it still wields great political and economic power, 
particularly in Colombia. The response and uncertainty brought by the Trump government’s 
rhetoric is only a symptom of this decay. And so, major shifts in policy are likely. Indeed, the 
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rhetoric might heighten around the issue of drug trafficking and the problem of Venezuela, but 
no prominent changes will take place.  
 
These continued dynamics involving U.S.-Colombia relations are due to several reasons, 
including:  
 
1. In the case of drug trafficking, some policies might shift, but as long as the U.S. does not 
approach their problem of drug consumption in a different way, the pressure from the U.S. to 
embrace more repressive means will continue as it has since the war on drugs began in the 
1970s. Repression reduces the availability of drugs and increases the prices of drugs, and in 
theory this means drugs should be less available to consumers. This logic, however, neglects the 
nature of addiction, where prices remain inelastic.  
 
2. Whereas the rhetoric around Venezuela might escalate towards war and wild dreams of a joint 
operation involving Colombian and U.S. forces, the reality is that the international economy and 
the U.S. cannot afford to maintain two simultaneous conflicts in areas that hold some of the 
biggest oil reserves in the world. Also the U.S. is aware that the use of military force would 
provide legitimacy to the Maduro regime and its claims of U.S. imperialism attacking Venezuela, 
in addition to the likelihood of a diplomatic response by most of the countries in Latin America 
rejecting a military operation in the area. 
 
2. Friends with benefits: From war to peace building (1998-2018) 
Whereas one could understand the historical relationship between the U.S. and Colombia as 
acrimonious due to the loss of Panama at the beginning of the twentieth century, the relationship 
has been cordial since the loss of Panama (Tickner, 2017). From intimate cooperation on drug 
trafficking, to assistance with combating illicit crops, and cooperation in declarations against the 
Maduro government, Colombia is one of the U.S.’s closest Latin American allies.   
 
The current relationship between Colombia and the U.S. was deepened within the Pastrana 
(1998-2002) and Uribe (2002-2010) administrations as part of the war on terror against the 
FARC-EP
2
, ELN,
 3
 and paramilitary forces. The design and the implementation of this 
cooperation was mostly framed and conceived as Plan Colombia, which included an aid package 
of tactical and military assistance designed "to ensure effective control over the national 
territory, the strengthening of democratic institutions, the pursuit of economic development and 
the protection of human rights. Likewise, assistance to increase counter-narcotics capabilities in 
Colombia, as well as improvement in the protection of human rights” (United States Agency for 
International Development, 2012). 
 
Two objectives structured the plan: the enhancement of military capabilities, and the 
improvement in the presence and legitimacy of the government. These would be achieved by 
strengthening through public investment and development within the country. Between 2000 and 
2006, according to the DNP,
4
 the resources invested by Plan Colombia reached $4.8 billion 
USD. The effectiveness of this aid was apparent in the increase in the training and investment in 
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hardware in the armed forces, including, for example, many new tactical tools (e.g. night vision 
goggles, enhanced infantry weaponry, laser guided bombs, helicopters (Saumeth, 2011). 
This was perhaps the most effective military aid program ever undertaken by the U.S. This 
intervention stopped the military advances of guerrillas, forced them to change their tactics, and 
allowed the state to partially regain the territorial control lost in the mid-1990s to different armed 
groups. A forced eradication program against illicit crops was also central to this policy. 
Eradication aimed to deter the production of drugs by the spraying of chemicals onto the illicit 
crops used for producing drugs (coca and poppy crops), with the hope that this would limit the 
resources guerrillas would receive from taxing the production and trafficking of items related to 
the production and traffic of drugs.  
 
In spite of the human and environmental costs of this policy, the use of toxic agents
5
 was 
effective in reducing the area of coca crops which decreased from 163,000 to 69,000 hectares 
between 2001 and 2016
6
.  What is more, the number of intentional homicides "decreased 60% in 
the last 15 years, from 66 [in 2001] to 26 [in 2015] per 100,000 inhabitants” (Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación, 2016). 
 
While the U.S. financed the military component, the state sought resources from Europe to 
finance the social component. The state implemented three key social development programs: 
“Familias en acción”, “Jóvenes en acción” and “Empleo en acción”7 for which “$1.5 Billion 
would be obtained through the donors roundtable that will meet in Madrid, Spain, with 
contributions from European and Asian countries” (El Tiempo, 2000).  
 
Plan Colombia no doubt allowed for deeper and wider cooperation between both countries, but it 
also contributed to the internationalization of the Colombian conflict (Tickner, 2017). The 
newfound militarist approach prioritized the issue of conflict and drug trafficking, and neglected 
issues like the environment, human rights, and democracy promotion. 
 
Despite military successes between 1998 and 2008, and support from both the Department of 
State and U.S. Congress for Plan Colombia, Barack Obama and the Democrats reduced support 
for the Colombian military campaign. Under Obama, the U.S. agenda shifted. U.S. state 
discourse changed focus from the war against terrorism, to include additional foreign policy 
matters, such as environmental issues and human rights.  
 
This did not mean the U.S abandoned investment in military training or counter insurgency, but 
it meant that they would deploy different levers to exert influence in addition to existing ones. In 
the case of Colombia, this meant the use of human rights, as well as an environmental agenda, to 
leverage the free trade agreement negotiation process between the two countries. 
 
When Santos was elected to the presidency in 2010 as an advocate of the continuation of a 
military approach to the conflict and the problem of drug trafficking, nobody was expecting 
Santos would shift the scope and reach of Colombian foreign policy, aiming to expand its reach 
and influence, while aiming to diminish the tensions with neighboring countries such as 
Venezuela and Ecuador, which had escalated in the Uribe years (2002-2010).  
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As stated in the strategic planning program of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
new objective was to promote “national interests through the strengthening and geographic and 
thematic diversification of foreign policy, prioritizing international cooperation and development 
of the borders" (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014). For some Colombian academics this 
meant "the transition from the doctrine of neo-respice polum to the approach of the neo-respice 
similia (to look at others)" (Pastrana, 2011, p. 2). 
 
The transformation of policy also took place in the domestic arena. From an agenda built around 
"securitization," the government shifted the internal policy towards an approach emphasizing 
peace. Whereas under Uribe, Colombian foreign policy was defined by the search for peace with 
paramilitary groups and providing a response to the denunciation of the murder of civilians by 
the armed forces (called in Colombia "false positives"), the Santos government used the military 
advantages to search for peace with all insurgent groups.
8
 This received support from the 
international community, including not only Latin American governments, but also many 
European nations. 
 
This shift was materialized in the "Política de prosperidad democrática"
9
 which facilitated the 
conditions for a political negotiation while taking advantage of the military change in the balance 
of power
10
. The arrival to a peace agreement was the product of a negotiation, a process that had 
an agenda that revolved around the topics of “political participation, rural reform, illicit drugs 
and illicit crops, transitional justice, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, and the 
implementation of the agreements.” (Nasi, 2018; Oficina Del Alto Comisionado para La Paz, 
2018). 
 
The Santos government had the objective of normalizing relations with their left-leaning 
neighbors. But, it also wished to respond to international concerns with regards to human rights, 
and aimed for a pragmatic attitude with the rest of the region. At the same time, it aimed for 
profound cooperation with the U.S. and to "give continuity to the military, economic and 
political support that the country had received through Plan Colombia, in addition to the 
continuity, an attempt was made to broaden the bilateral agenda, […] in order to establish a more 
lasting and balanced alliance” (Rojas, 2013, p.126). 
 
The change in the doctrine of security within the country did not mean that the peace 
negotiations with the FARC-EP would be compromised though. Since the beginning of the peace 
process, the Colombian government had U.S. support, but with some conditions as "[…] the 
fight against drugs must be maintained" (Rojas, 2013, p. 126). It is important to note that the 
U.S. was not a negotiating member at Havana, but its role was important within the process. 
Should the U.S. had vetoed the negotiations, no agreement would have been reached. 
 
Several facts demonstrate U.S. support for this process. First, 62 U.S. Congressional members 
sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, asking for support for the peace process and 
requesting an economic assistance package for the implementation of post-conflict policies 
(Haugaard, 2013). Secondly, the U.S. appointed Bernard Aronson as special envoy to the 
negotiations, who had experience in the peace process in El Salvador.  
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Throughout the process, Aronson traveled multiple times to Havana during the dialogues. John 
Kerry, then Secretary of State, also traveled to Cuba at different time. U.S. participation indeed 
"had a low profile and from time to time manifested their support in public," but its support was 
necessary for the attainment of a peace agreement (La Franchi, 2016). All this took place, while 
the FARC-EP remained part of the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. 
 
Despite the support for peace, the issue of drugs remained a U.S. priority. It is no surprise then 
that this agreement involved the implementation of a plan to counter illicit crops (PNIS
11
), and 
the agreements still aimed to reduce the number of coca crops during 2018 in more than 40 
municipalities through a gradual approach where "[…] there are various eradication strategies in 
which the first option is voluntary, followed by manual eradication forced and as a last resort, 
aerial spraying” (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el delito (UNODC), 2018). 
 
In a way, it was expected that the achievement of a peace agreement “[would] lead to an advance 
in the war on drugs, [however, there has been] an increase in crops since 2013 in several regions 
of the country" (Rojas, 2017, p. 43).  As of December 2017, the area with coca crops in 
Colombia has “increased by 17%, reaching 171,000 […] hectares” (Oficina de las Naciones 
Unidas contra la Droga y el delito (UNODC), 2018). 
 
This increase in illicit crops is partially explained by the decision during the second Santos 
government (2014-2018) to reduce the aerial spraying of illicit crops. The administration made 
this choice due to the decision by the Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes that pointed out the 
public health risk of using chemicals.  
 
The increase on illicit crops became one of the main arguments wielded by the CD party,
12
 led 
by former President Uribe, to claim the failure of the peace agreements. In December 2016, 
Uribe, leader of the opposition to the peace agreement, traveled to Washington to meet with 
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken; legislators from both parties; people close to Trump, 
such as Rudy Giuliani; and with some Congressmen, all with the objective of seeking support 
from the U.S. government to reject the peace agreements.  
 
The opposition from the CD to the peace agreement did not operate in a vacuum as the FARC-
EP was a highly unpopular organization. Indeed, broad sectors of the population rejected the 
peace agreements, not only because of the agreements themselves, but because they also disliked 
the FARC-EP and also rejected the Santos government, peace was less popular than their hatred 
for the FARC-EP, or the lack of popularity of Santos.  
 
The arrival of Trump was preceded by a conservative backlash following the peace agreement 
signed during the Santos administration. In the context of political polarization between 
opponents and supporters of the agreement, new elections were held in 2018, which gave the CD 
a high number of representatives and supported the election of Ivan Duque into the presidency of 
Colombia (Diaz & Jiménez, 2018).  
 
President Duque is a former freshman in the Colombian congress (2014-2018) who gained 
salience with his opposition to the peace agreements. His political career before entering 
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congress was marked by being a political appointee of different governments at the Inter-
American Development Bank and the Colombian Ministry of Finance. With his entrance to the 
senate with the CD party, his policies have been more aligned with Colombian right wing 
parties. Whereas his political statements depicts him as a centre figure, even quoting Nelson 
Mandela at the UN, most of his support and political  decisions respond to the demands from the 
Colombian hard-right, having announced his opposition to the transitional justice framework, 
and filibustering with the CD the institutions that have the mission of implementing the peace 
accords with the FARC-EP.  
 
Recent decisions such as blocking the provisions for the implementation of a special jurisdiction 
for peace for the victims of the Colombian conflict position him as someone that is not respectful 
of the division or powers enshrined in the Colombian constitution, and as a President that is not 
willing to comply with the agreements signed by the Colombian state (The Economist, 2019).  In 
this instance, his counter-institutional positions resemble Trump government policies. Several 
government officials have been fired during his government for not aligning with his government 
policies that include the denial of the peace agreements, the rejection of the rights for the 
LGBTQI community, and the rights of minorities (afro-descendants and indigenous groups).  
 
Whereas the presidential elections were informed by a Conservative agenda, it is important to 
note that the second most popular candidate was a representative of a broad coalition of left and 
center parties. Nonetheless, the election of Duque generated a realignment between the 
conservative views of the U.S. and the conservative views of some important sectors in 
Colombia assuming a subordinate stance towards the U.S.  
 
In addition, the humanitarian crisis taking place due to the economic collapse of Venezuela and 
the rise of right wing parties in Latin America have brought a restoration of more conservative 
views regarding politics and the state (López, 2016). Whereas not all Latin American countries 
are embracing conservative politics, several countries are swaying right, an interesting change in 
a region that saw a rise in left-wing politics over the last few decades.  
 
Before taking office, Duque visited the U.S. to meet with politicians aligned with the Republican 
Party and the Trump administration, and to reveal the interest by Colombian political elites in 
maintaining and strengthening the U.S.–Colombia relationship and how the commonality of 
interests are chosen and deployed in order to facilitate cooperation between both countries. This 
has been referred as an relationship in which “intervention happens by invitation” of the 
Colombian Government (Tickner, 2017). 
 
Whereas the issue of drug production and illicit crop growth has been central to the relation 
between Colombia and the U.S. for decades, the Duque government has taken advantage of this 
alignment to bring "attention to the intensity and strategic interest of the bilateral relationship, 
crossed, unfortunately but undeniably, by the criminal presence of drug trafficking" (El 
Colombiano, 2018).  
 
Thus, despite that Trump is seen as a disruptive force due to his lack of a clear institutional 
approach towards foreign policy, the Colombian government under Duque is assuming a 
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pragmatic strategizing in which the Colombian government moves in whichever direction the 
(current) U.S government has decided to focus disregarding local policies and agreements such 
as the ones stated in the peace agreements with the FARC-EP.  
 
The bilateral agenda under Trump involves intense cooperation and stability on important issues, 
but given the centrality of drug trafficking and drug production, this does not really present a 
break with the past. The break is not taking place in the issues, it takes place in the policies, the 
rhetoric and communication taking place.  
 
3. The end of institutional International Relations?  The arrival of Donald Trump 
 
Many have argued that the arrival of Trump has catalyzed a seismic shift in U.S. policy. Some 
have argued that negotiations with North Korea and rapprochement with Russia in the middle of 
the meddling scandal demonstrate this (Masters, 2018). 
 
The analysis of this claim should distinguish between the discursive style and the actual policies, 
differentiating between specific cases and the general trend of foreign affairs within the U.S.  
Whereas the style of Trump is definitely less institutional, and can be seen as subversive and 
even patrimonial, we should draw out clear distinctions in order to understand these dynamics.  
So far, Trump’s arrival has changed some state policies with regards to some particular 
countries, but his administration has not changed the U.S. approaches to all countries where the 
U.S. has diplomatic presence. Thus, when we talk about difference between governments we 
might be focusing on the policy changes, rather than on the policies that are not changing.  
Another option is to consider whether we distinguish between the parties in power -- Republican 
and Democratic governments – and their policies, and whether the changes in the presidency 
actually bring about a continuation or a re-emergence of previous policies undertaken by the 
previous government. If this is the case, we could potentially observe continuity in state policies, 
but a divergence between government policies. Trump thus could be seen as governmental 
divergence, but offering nothing more than state continuity in terms of actual policies.  
There are surely some changes taking place in reaction to the growing presence of China and 
Russia in several Latin American countries, and the response by the U.S. government has been a 
return to old policies. Nothing new is being attempted here; old policies are proposed again to 
similar challenges. Thus, the return to a more interventionist/confrontational approach is nothing 
different from what was observed in, for example Grenada, Panama, and El Salvador during the 
1980s. The return to the Monroe Doctrine in foreign policy, which Trump’s former Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson explicitly endorsed, is quite simply a rehash of old ideas, thinking they will 
be good enough to face new challenges within a more complex setting.  
In the case of Colombia, Chinese investment has been less visible in comparison with other Latin 
American countries. Yet, this does not mean Chinese investment is totally absent. In Colombia, 
in recent years, the Chinese government, through the Chinese Development Bank, in cooperation 
with the National Development Bank (FDN), has signed infrastructure investment agreements 
throughout the country (Revista Portafolio, 2018).  
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China has attempted a more soft–powered approach with scholarships and business rounds “as 
commissions mixed cooperation in economy [,] trade, [science] and [scholarships]” (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010, p.12-13) to attract support within Colombia. However, these 
investments have not reflected any potential policy shift in Colombia towards the U.S. Should 
the Chinese market become a potential source of investment expansion for Colombian exporters 
and industrials,  we could observe a shift in relations. For now, Colombia aims to benefit from 
strong relations with both China and the U.S. without irritating either global power. 
The arrival of Trump brought a series of uncertainties to Colombia, as well as to the rest of the 
world. The rise of Trump brought questions to both the Santos government and the incumbent 
Duque government (Pardo, 2017; León, 2017). The challenge for the Colombian government has 
been to make sense of the different declarations of the then-candidate, and now president, and 
how they would affect Colombia.  
The question was not about what to do with the president of the U.S., but rather how to make 
sense of his international relations agenda, given incoherent statements. As most of Trump’s 
rhetoric on the campaign remained focused on domestic issues, the few remarks that related to 
foreign affairs and Colombia were vague and unclear.  
Though Trump was clearly pursuing a right-wing populist approach, this was not in itself 
anything new. George W. Bush also brought a flavor of this in previous years. Colombia, 
however, is no revolutionary country, and it does not explicitly oppose Trumpian political or 
ideological hegemony in Latin America. In many ways, Colombia aligns with the U.S. ethos as a 
conservative country, and the policies and the discourses of Trump resonated with a segment of 
the Colombian population. For example, talking “tough” on drug trafficking, emphasizing 
military cooperation, and confronting the crisis in Venezuela are all positions that the Colombian 
polity is familiar with. The reality is that the arrival of Trump presents a more dramatic shift for 
non-aligned countries with the U.S., as Colombia has been mostly aligned with the U.S. 
throughout its history (Tickner, 2017).   
A hard position on drugs is something that has persisted in the U.S. since the Nixon era. And 
Colombia, for its part, has been spraying and undertaking a forced eradication approach to illicit 
crops, and has continued the policies of interdiction of illicit drugs in spite of their proven failure 
since this time in spite of the evidence that this is a policy bound to continue failing (Mejia, 
2017). . As the logic of force resonates with many Republican politicians, the biggest shift in this 
area to consider is how eradication will take place, especially due to the increase in consumption 
of hard drugs across the U.S. According to data from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
fatalities increased to 72,000/year in 2017 and “consumption increased by about 10% over the 
previous year … the more than 72,000 drug overdose deaths estimated in 2017, the sharpest 
increase occurred among deaths related to […] (synthetic opioids) with nearly 30,000 overdose 
deaths” (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2018).  
Some might certainly link the increase in consumption with the increase in production, such as in 
Colombia. However, this ignores the fact that drug production fills a preexisting demand for 
them. Amid these dynamics, the new Colombian government has looked to align with the new 
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U.S. policy. In doing so, the new Colombian governments has decided  to prohibit the personal 
use of drugs, a decision that is seen as “more than a legal act, a political act [...] Duque is looking 
for applause, but these measures are inefficient to combat the large drug trafficking groups and to 
reduce the damages associated with them” (Espinosa, 2018).  
Coca production is confronted through the direct eradication of coca crops, and also through the 
fight against drug cartels. Yet, it is rarely seen that the policies aim to curb the flow of money 
from trafficking. It is no coincidence that Colombia is one of the fastest growing crypto-currency 
markets “with a growth of 370%” (Crypto Curry, 2018). Money laundering is central to 
trafficking, but it is not yet seen as strategically important for either the U.S. or Colombia in the 
design of their policies against drugs. And so, in the end, cooperation with regards to security 
and drugs has not witnessed substantial changes under Trump. 
A key element in foreign relations between the U.S. and Colombia also involves the use of 
Colombia as a foreign training ground for soldiers from other countries. Within Colombia, the 
U.S. has financed training initiatives for members of the armed forces from countries like 
Afghanistan, Guatemala, Honduras, México, and Indonesia (Marino, 2015). This cooperation is 
important for three reasons: (1) training forces from these countries is more contentious in the 
U.S. due to the human rights records of these countries; (2) the costs of training are lower in 
Colombia; and (3) the training grounds and nature of the clashes are closer to the landscapes, 
experiences, and the tactics of Colombia, as opposed to the U.S.  
 
Overall, the connection between military cooperation and counter-narcotics policies are 
summarized by declarations from the Trump government: "support and cooperation of the 
Colombian government from the military field, to compl[y] with the law and the development is 
extraordinary and is something that we try to replicate with other countries, (...) so the United 
States is ready to support [the Colombian government] in its efforts, [while] simultaneously I am 
working diligently to fight [drug] consumption internally" (Presidencia de la República de 
Colombia, 2017). Thus, whereas there is an overall decline in U.S. financial support for 
Colombia (from $474 million in 2017 to $33 million in 2018), this amount remains significant, 
making Colombia the biggest aid recipient in the Western Hemisphere (USAID, 2018).     
 
Finally, the crisis in Venezuela also bears on relations between the two. The challenge presented 
by the authoritarian regime of Maduro is not entirely new for Colombia, as tensions between 
Colombia and Venezuela have existed since late Chávez came to power in 1999. The tensions 
along the border during the last 20 years have been related to drug trafficking, and the existence 
of armed groups in Colombia.  
 
What the election of Maduro in 2013 signified for Colombia was the intensification of an 
internal problem in Venezuela. But, the economic, social, and political breakdown in Venezuela 
has now become a transnational challenge, with the exodus of Venezuelans into the country. The 
Venezuelan situation has now generated a refugee crisis throughout the continent that includes 
more than one million reported refugees entering into Colombia in the last few years, and 
counting (Galindo, 2018).  
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Venezuela and issues involving drugs are also not separate. Drug trafficking has increased in 
Venezuela, and there are alleged alliances between drug cartels and sectors of the Venezuelan 
armed forces. As Venezuela remains one of the main routes of traffickers to exports drugs to 
Europe (Mejia, 2016). Within Venezuela, “a key moment in the strengthening of drug trafficking 
occurred with the expulsion from the DEA in 2005 … combined with the suspension of the 
agreement of over flight to monitor narco-flights” (InSight Crime, 2018, p.20). As a result, 
Venezuelan government policies have seemingly exacerbated existing drug trafficking problems 
in the region. 
 
 
4. The future of the agenda:  Drugs, peace and Venezuela  
The most important issue between the U.S. and Colombia involves drug trafficking. The forced 
eradication of illicit crops and the increase in drug consumption in the U.S. largely monopolizes 
the bilateral agenda. And this has the potential to severely affect the implementation process of 
the FARC-EP/Colombian government agreements. The challenge lies in the fact that illicit crops 
and the processing of drugs have been intertwined with the Colombian conflict. The places 
where the drug trade has taken place are usually the places where the state is weak or absent 
(19% of the Colombian territory) (Mejia, 2016). Embracing a tough discourse on drugs and their 
production might thus affect the implementation of the peace agreements, give political credence 
to the remaining armed organizations, and subsidize the finances of spoilers through repression. 
The objective of curbing production via eradication or spraying of chemicals is to weaken the 
chain of production of drugs. However, in practice this has meant the alienation of the citizenry 
in the areas where coca is grown, the default of the government on its previous promises with 
regards to illicit crops and the peace process, and has allowed drug cartels to recruit former 
cadres of the FARC-EP who became discontented by the failure of the state to deliver its 
promises. The areas where coca is grown lie in the faultiness of the Colombian state, where the 
peace agreements initiatives were mostly to take place, and where the state still believes the logic 
of force will work.   
 
A case in point is the city of Tumaco on the Colombian Pacific. In this area of the country, drug 
trafficking and illicit crops are part of a subsistence economy, where a political economy of 
drugs is central to the livelihoods of marginalized communities. In this case, for example, "88% 
of the population is Afro-Colombian, and the representatives of the … community affirm that we 
plant [coca] for the support of our families, since licit crops do not give us anything" (Gonzalez, 
2017, p. 10).  
 
These situations raise questions about the relationship concerning a military approach to a socio-
economic problem, not only due to the likelihood of failure, but given the risks of giving political 
capital to armed groups and traffickers, weakening the standing of the state with many 
communities, and forfeiting the opportunity for the state to reassert its presence in these areas. 
Whereas the monopoly of force is central to statehood, it cannot replace state-building and state 
institutions. This is why alternative development projects in these territories were a central part 
of the peace agreements signed between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government.  
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The fight against drugs, however, is a function of the demand. Therefore, attempting to curve 
consumption and its increase in the U.S. is the elephant in the room. This requires considering 
what the elements that drive consumption are, and how they relate to the socio-economic and 
cultural realm within the U.S., for which no agenda besides repression is being proposed. In the 
last few years, there was greater international advocacy for dealing with drug consumption as a 
public health issue, such as, for example, by the Colombian government together with the 
Guatemalan and Mexican governments. Repression yet remains. 
With the signature of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP, the Colombian military sector has 
started to analyze regional and international challenges beyond public order, and have begun 
considering scenarios involving the border tensions with Nicaragua
13
 and Venezuela. On the 
Venezuelan end, for instance, the Venezuelan government has purchased military hardware from 
countries like Russia and Belarus. These arms purchases have alarmed the Colombian 
government, and created fear about the need for such a military build-up. As a response, the 
Colombian state has closely integrated with U.S. military exercises.  
The signature of a military cooperation agreement with NATO by former President Santos on 
December 23, 2017, as well as the United States-Colombia joint air maneuvers at the Palanquero 
Air Base in July 2017, are clear examples of the deep military cooperation between the two 
countries (Lippo, 2017). These actions are expected to serve as deterrents.  
Whereas some sectors in the U.S. and in Colombia would prefer a tougher approach towards to 
Venezuela, they must remember that interventions based on the use of force or coercion give 
political capital and support against whom those measures are imposed. In a similar way, as with 
drug production and trafficking, both the U.S. and Colombia need to envision alternatives that 
facilitate democratic change in Venezuela without giving political capital to the Maduro regime. 
The interventions taking place in the international arena within the OAS and other international 
organizations are a good alternative to this.  
In the end, and in spite of the geo-strategic concerns of both Colombia and the U.S., the power 
and the projection of power from the U.S. in Colombia will remain. Whether the hard stance on 
drugs fuels the war and the conflict in Colombia for the next century, or the alignment of 
Colombia pushes the Colombian government towards an unseen interventionist approach 
towards its neighbors, at the end it is the soft-power that has influenced Colombian policymakers 
to decide to use force. The responsibility lies in their hands, and it cannot be attributed to the 
U.S. government alone. Be it naiveté, or a willingness to support the policies of Trump, 
Colombia will follow the lead of the hegemon, no matter who is the president in power there.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1
 According to the report América Latina y el Caribe y China: hacía una nueva era de 
cooperación económica of CEPAL: “China is already the second main origin of the imports of 
the region, and the third largest destination of its exports. Between 2000 and 2014, its share in 
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regional exports went from 1% to 9% (in 2013 it reached 10%), while its share in imports it went 
from little more than 2% to 16%” (CEPAL, 2015). 
 
2. Revolutionary Alternative Forces of Colombia- People’s Army. 
 
3. National Liberation Army. 
     
4
 National planning department of Colombia. 
5
 It is important to note that studies in recent years highlight a relationship between glyphosate 
and increased cancer. According to public health reports: "It has been shown that manipulation 
of glyphosate by the peasant population is insecure. Studies have shown the presence of this 
herbicide in the body in people who are exposed for work or involuntary reasons, even in 
children through the bad storage conditions, and this is because this toxic has no absorption only 
gastrointestinal, but also mucocutaneous and inhaled. Some in vitro experiments have shown 
cytotoxicity and genotoxicity of exposure to glyphosate, hence the association that is attributed 
to cancer” (Campuzano Cortina C, Feijoó Fonnegra LM, Manzur Pineda K, Palacio Muñoz M, 
Rendón Fonnegra J, Zapata Díaz JP, 2017,pp 127). 
 
6
 Something to note here is the impact of this policy on the gross production of cocaine. In fact, 
according to some reports, the output of the drug manufacturing process during these years 
seems to have been less severely hit. This hints at the improvement of the manufacturing process 
of cocaine, as well as the capacity to increase the yield of the crops. Thus drug traffickers were 
able to meet the demand with fewer crops. The financial incentives of repression contributed to 
this. (Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia y UNODC/SIMCI, 2013). 
7
 Families in action/ Youths in Action/ Employment in action 
 
8
 This, in addition to a series of internal challenges within the FARC-EP made evident the 
legitimacy gap of the FARC-EP, however for the government it was clear that military actions 
had a limit in their returns, whereas they had achieved to weaken logistically and strategically the 
FARC-EP, the FARC-EP was not defeated.      
 
9
 Democratic Prosperity Policy.     
10
 A series of military operations hit the FARC-EP leadership, such as the death of Raul Reyes 
(FARC-   EP’s chancellor) and Ivan Rios (One of the members of the guerrilla secretariat) in 
2008 and on 2010 Jorge Briceño (Military head of the FARC-EP), and in 2011 the FARC-EP 
leader Alfonso Cano 
11
 National Program for the Replacement of Crops for Illicit Use    
 
12 Democratic Center Party 
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13
 The tensions with Nicaragua refer to the claim of sovereignty of waters in the Caribbean Sea. 
Recently Nicaraguan Armed forces have acquired new armed vessels to patrol in these areas, 
which have generated tensions between both countries. 
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